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Abstract. Dynamics in a distributed system are self-stabilizing if they
are guaranteed to reach a stable state regardless of how the system is
initialized. Game dynamics are uncoupled if each player’s behavior is in-
dependent of the other players’ preferences. Recognizing an equilibrium
in this setting is a distributed computational task. Self-stabilizing un-
coupled dynamics, then, have both resilience to arbitrary initial states
and distribution of knowledge. We study these dynamics by analyzing
their behavior in a bounded-recall synchronous environment. We deter-
mine, for every “size” of game, the minimum number of periods of play
that stochastic (randomized) players must recall in order for uncoupled
dynamics to be self-stabilizing. We also do this for the special case when
the game is guaranteed to have unique best replies. For deterministic
players, we demonstrate two self-stabilizing uncoupled protocols. One
applies to all games and uses three steps of recall. The other uses two
steps of recall and applies to games where each player has at least four
available actions. For uncoupled deterministic players, we prove that a
single step of recall is insufficient to achieve self-stabilization, regardless
of the number of available actions.
1 Introduction
Self-stabilization is a failure-resilience property that is central to distributed
computing theory and is the subject of extensive research (see, e.g., [3] for a sur-
vey). It is characterized by the ability of a distributed system to reach a stable
state from every initial state. Dynamic interaction between strategic agents is a
central research topic in game theory (see, e.g., [4,11]). One area of interest is
uncoupled dynamics, in which each player’s strategy is independent of the other
players’ payoffs [9]. Here, we bring together these two research areas and initi-
ate the study of self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics within the broader research
agenda of distributed computing with adaptive heuristics [10]. This work is a first
step, and the same questions we answer here can be asked for a broad variety of
dynamics and notions of convergence and equilibria. These directions, as well as
a conjecture, are discussed in Section 5.
⋆ Research supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant No. CCF-1101690.
We focus our investigation on a bounded-recall, synchronous setting. We
consider self-stabilization in a multi-agent distributed system in which, at each
timestep, the agents act as strategic players in a game, simultaneously selecting
actions from their respective finite action sets to form an action profile. The
space of action profiles is relevant throughout this work, and we refer to its size
as the size of the game. We study the effects of bounded recall, in which the
state of this system at any time consists of the r most recent action profiles,
for some finite r. The stable states in r-recall systems necessarily have the same
action profile in r consecutive time steps. In our context, we want stable states
that are robust to players acting selfishly—i.e., those where the repeated action
profile is an equilibrium of the stage game. In this paper, we consider pure Nash
equilibria (PNE). Thus, in our setting, dynamics self-stabilize for a given game
if, from every starting state, players are guaranteed to converge to a PNE. For
games without PNE, dynamics cannot self-stabilize in this sense. Throughout
this paper, we say that particular dynamics succeed on a class of games if they
self-stabilize for games in that class whenever a PNE exists.
Traditional study of convergence to equilibria in game dynamics makes var-
ious assumptions about the “reasonableness” of players’ behavior, restricting
them to always play the game in ways that are somehow consistent with their
self-interest given their current knowledge. In contrast to these behavioral restric-
tions on the players, uncoupledness is an informational restriction, in that the
players have no knowledge of each other’s payoffs. In this situation, no individual
player can recognize a PNE, so finding an equilibrium is a truly distributed task.
If uncoupledness is the only restriction on the dynamics, then the players can
find a PNE through a straightforward exhaustive search. However, this changes
when players’ abilities to remember past actions is restricted. In a continuous-
time setting, Hart and Mas-Colell [7] showed that deterministic uncoupled dy-
namics fail to reach a stable state for some games that have PNE if the dynamics
must be historyless, i.e., if the state space of the system is identical to the action
profile space of the game. This suggests the central question that we address:
On a given class of games, how much recall do uncoupled players need
in order to self-stabilize whenever a PNE exists? That is, when are there
successful k-recall dynamics?
This question was answered in part by Hart and Mas-Colell [8], who showed
that in a discrete-time setting, even when players are allowed randomness, no his-
toryless uncoupled dynamics succeed on all two-player games where each player
has three actions. Moreover, they showed that even for generic games (where
at every action profile each player has a unique “best” action), no historyless
uncoupled dynamics succeed on games with three three-action players. They
also gave positive results, proving that there are historyless uncoupled dynamics
that succeed on all two-player generic games, and that if the players have 2-recall
(i.e., they are allowed to see the two most recent action profiles), then over every
action profile space there are stochastic uncoupled dynamics that succeed on all
games.
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Our results. We show in Section 3 that there exist historyless uncoupled dy-
namics that succeed on all two-player games with a two-action player and on
all three-player generic games with a two-action player (Theorems 4 and 9). In
both cases, we prove that these results are tight, in that they do not hold for any
larger size of game (Theorems 5 and 11). Combined with the results of Hart and
Mas-Colell [8], this provides a complete characterization of the exact minimum
recall needed, for any action profile space, for uncoupled dynamics to succeed
on all games over that space and on generic games over that space. In Section 4,
turning to deterministic dynamics, we demonstrate 3-recall deterministic uncou-
pled dynamics that succeed on all games (Theorem 14) and 2-recall deterministic
uncoupled dynamics that succeed on all games in which every player has at least
four actions (Theorem 15). We also prove for every action profile space that
no historyless deterministic uncoupled dynamics succeed on all games over that
space (Theorem 16).
Related work. There are rich connections between distributed computing and
game theory, some of which are surveyed by Halpern [5]. Jaggard, Schapira, and
Wright [10] investigated convergence to pure Nash equilibria by game dynamics
in asynchronous distributed systems. Most closely related to our specific setting,
Hart and Mas-Colell introduced the concept of uncoupled game dynamics [7].
In addition to the results mentioned above, they also addressed convergence to
mixed Nash equilibria by bounded-recall uncoupled dynamics [8]. Babichenko
investigated the situation when the uncoupled players are finite-state automata,
as well as completely uncoupled dynamics, in which each player can see only the
history of its own actions and payoffs [1,2]. Hart and Mansour [6] analyzed the
time to convergence for uncoupled dynamics.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with definitions of the concepts used in the paper.
Games. Let n ∈ N and (k1, ..., kn) ∈ N
n, with n ≥ 2 and each ki ≥ 2. A game of
size (k1, ..., kn) is a pair (A,U), where A = A1× ...×An such that each |Ai| = ki,
and U = (u1, ..., un) is an n-tuple of functions ui : A → R. Ai and ui are the
action set and utility function of player i. ∆(Ai), the probability simplex over
Ai, is player i’s set of mixed actions. When n is small, we may describe a game
(A,U) as a k1-by-...-by-kn game. Elements of A are the (action) profiles of the
game, and A is called the (action) profile space. U(A) is the the class of all U
such that each ui takes Ai as input, so A× U(A) is the class of all games with
profile space A. When A is clear from context, we often identify the game with
the utility function vector U .
Let U ∈ U(A). For i ∈ {1, ..., n} and a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A, we say that player
i is U -best-replying at a if ui(a) ≥ ui((a1, ..., a
′
i, ..., an)) for every a
′
i ∈ Ai. We
define the set of U -best-replies for player i at a,
BRUi (a) = {a
′
i ∈ Ai : i is U -best-replying at (a1, ..., a
′
i, ..., an)}.
3
We omit U from this notation when the game being played is clear from context.
A profile p ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium, abbreviated PNE, for U if every
player i ∈ {1, ..., n} is best-replying at p. An action ai ∈ Ai is weakly dominant
for player i if ai ∈ BRi(x) for every x ∈ A; it is strictly dominant for player i if
BRi(x) = {ai} for every x ∈ A.
A game (A,U) ∈ A× U(A) is generic if every player’s best-replies are unique,
i.e., if for every a ∈ A and i ∈ {1, ..., n}, |BRUi (a)|=1. For generic games (A,U)
we may abuse notation slightly by using BRUi (a) to refer to this set’s unique
element. A× G(A) is the class of all generic games on A.
Dynamics. We now consider the repeated play of a game. Let the profile at
timestep t ∈ Z be a(t) =
(
a
(t)
1 , ..., a
(t)
n
)
∈ A. The stage game (A,U) ∈ A ×
U(A) is then played: each player i simultaneously selects a new action a
(t+1)
i by
applying an r-recall stationary strategy fUi : A
r → ∆(Ai), where r ∈ N and
Ar is the Cartesian product of A with itself r times. A deterministic r-recall
stationary strategy mapping ranges over Ai instead of ∆(Ai). The strategy f
U
i ,
which is stationary in the sense that it does not depend on t, will take as input
(a(t−r+1), ..., a(t)), the r most recent profiles. We call this r-tuple the state at
time t. The terms 1-recall and historyless are interchangeable. A strategy vector
is an n-tuple fU = (fU1 , ..., f
U
n ), where each f
U
i is a strategy for player i. F(A)
will denote the set of all strategy vectors for A.
A strategy mapping for A is a mapping f : U(A) → F(A) that assigns to
each U a strategy vector fU . A strategy mapping f is uncoupled if the strategy
it assigns each player depends only on that player’s utility function and not, e.g.,
on the other players’ payoffs. That is, there are mappings f1, ..., fn where each
fi maps utility functions on A to strategies for A, such that fi(ui) ≡ f
U
i for
i = 1, ..., n. If fUi is stationary, deterministic, or r-recall for i = 1, ..., n, then f
U
is also. If every fU has any of those properties, then f does also.
Now let x =
(
x(1), ..., x(r)
)
∈ Ar, and let fU be an r-recall strategy vector.
For T ≥ r, a partial fU -run for T steps starting from x is a tuple of profiles(
a(1), ..., a(T+r)
)
∈ AT+r such that x = (a(1), ..., a(r)) and for every r < t ≤ T+r,
Pr
(
fU
(
a(t−r), ..., a(t−1)
)
= a(t)
)
> 0.
An fU -run is an infinite sequence of profiles a(1), a(2), ... such that every finite
prefix is a partial fU -run. We say that y ∈ Ar is fU -reachable from x ∈ Ar if there
exist a T ∈ N and a partial fU -run
(
a(1), ..., a(T+r)
)
such that x = (a(1), ..., a(r))
and y =
(
a(T ), ..., a(T+r)
)
. The state x is an fU -absorbing state if for every fU -
run a(1), a(2), ... beginning from x,
(
a(t+1), ..., a(t+r)
)
= x for every t ∈ N. Notice
that any fU -absorbing state x =
(
a(1), ..., a(r)
)
must have a(1) = ... = a(r). We
omit the strategy vector from this notation when it is clear from context. The
game dynamics of f consist of all pairs (U,R) such that R is an fU -run.
Convergence. A sequence of profiles a(1), a(2), ... converges to a profile a if there
some T ∈ N such that a(t) = a for every t ≥ T . If from every x ∈ Ar, some
4
fU -absorbing PNE is fU -reachable, then f self-stabilizes on game (A,U). We
say that f succeeds on a game U if f self-stabilizes on (A,U) or if (A,U) has
no PNE. Let C(A) be a class of games on A. If f succeeds on every game
(A,U) ∈ A× C(A), then f succeeds on C(A).
Let A = A1 × ... × An and B = B1 × ... × Bn be profile spaces of the
same size, in the sense that there is some permutation π on {1, ..., n} such that
(|A1|, ..., |An|) = (|Bπ(1)|, ..., |Bπ(n)|). Then we write A ≃ B. If f succeeds on
C(A), then there is a strategy mapping derived from f that succeeds on C(B),
simply by rearranging the players and bijectively mapping actions in each Ai
to actions in Bπ(i). This new strategy mapping retains any properties of f that
are of interest here (uncoupledness, r-recall, stationarity, and determinism). For
this reason we define
C(|A1|, ..., |An|) =
⋃
B≃A
C(B),
and we say that f succeeds on C(|A1|, ..., |An|) if f succeeds on C(B) for some
B ≃ A. For example, “f succeeds on G(2, 3)” means “f self-stabilizes on every
generic 2-by-3 game with a PNE (up to renaming of actions).”
3 Stochastic uncoupled dynamics
In this section, we determine, for every profile space A, the minimum r ∈ N such
that an uncoupled r-recall stationary strategy mapping exists that succeeds on
all games (A,U) ∈ A × U(A) or all generic games (A,U) ∈ A × G(A). Hart
and Mas-Colell [8] proved that 2-recall is sufficient to succeed on all games, 1-
recall is sufficient to succeed on generic two-player games, and that 1-recall is
not sufficient to succeed on all games, or even all generic games. We state these
results in the present setting.
Theorem 1 (Hart and Mas-Colell [8]). For any profile space A, there exists an
uncoupled 2-recall stationary strategy mapping that succeeds on all games (A,U).
Theorem 2 (Hart and Mas-Colell [8]). There is no uncoupled historyless sta-
tionary strategy mapping that succeeds on all 3-by-3 games, or on all 3-by-3-by-3
generic games.
Theorem 3 (Hart and Mas-Colell [8]). For any two-player profile space A,
there is an uncoupled historyless stationary strategy mapping that succeeds on
all generic games (A,U).
We now describe the strategy mapping given in the proof of Theorem 3.
Notice that for a historyless stationary strategy mapping, the state space is
exactly the profile space, so the terms state and profile are interchangeable in
this context.
Definition For any n-player profile spaceA, the canonical historyless uncoupled
stationary strategy mapping for A is h : U(A) → F(A), defined as follows. Let
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U = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U(A). Then h(U) = (h
U
1 , ..., h
U
n ), where for i ∈ {1, ..., n},
hUi : A→ Ai is given by
Pr
(
hU (ai) = ai | ai ∈ BRi(a)
)
= 1
Pr
(
hU (ai) = bi | ai 6∈ BRi(a)
)
= 1/ki,
for all ai, bi ∈ Ai. That is, if player i is already best replying, then it will continue
to play the same action. Otherwise, i will play an action chosen uniformly at
random from its action set.
In their proof of Theorem 2, Hart and Mas-Colell make the following obser-
vation.
Observation 1 (Hart and Mas-Colell [8]). Suppose f is an uncoupled histo-
ryless stationary strategy mapping for profile space A and f succeeds on all
generic games (A,U). Then two conditions hold for every game (A,U) and a =
(a1, ..., an) ∈ A. First, if player i is best-replying at a, then Pr(f
U
i (a) = ai) = 1.
Second, if player i is not best replying at a, then Pr(fUi (a) = a
′
i) > 0 for some
a′i ∈ Ai r {ai}.
Informally, no player can move when it is best-replying, and each player must
move w.p.p. whenever it is not best-replying. The first condition guarantees that
every PNE is an absorbing state; the second guarantees that no non-PNE is an
absorbing state. Implicit in the same proof is the fact that h is at least as
“powerful” as any other historyless uncoupled strategy mapping.
Observation 2 (Hart and Mas-Colell [8]). If any historyless uncoupled station-
ary strategy mapping succeeds on U(A) or on G(A), then h succeeds on that
class.
3.1 Stochastic dynamics for U(A)
We now describe the profile spaces in which there are uncoupled historyless
strategy mappings that succeed on every game, or equivalently (by Observation
2), the A for which h succeeds on U(A). A proof that h succeeds on 2-by-k
games is given in the appendix. It proceeds by simple case checking but may be
a useful warmup for working with these dynamics.
Theorem 4. For every two-player profile space A in which one player has only
two actions, h succeeds on all games (A,U).
It turns out that 2-by-k profile spaces are the only ones where h succeeds on
all games.
Theorem 5. Let A be a profile space. Unless A has only two players and one of
those players has only two actions, no historyless uncoupled stationary strategy
mapping succeeds on all games (A,U).
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We give three lemmas that will be used in the proof of Theorem 5. Their full
proofs are in the appendix. Informally, Lemma 6 says that additional actions
do not make a profile space any “easier” in this context; the players will need
at least as much recall to succeed on all games in the larger space. The proof
relies on a type of reduction in which the players take advantage of a strategy
mapping for a larger game by “pretending” to play the larger game. Whenever
player i plays ki, all players guess randomly whether i would have played ki or
ki + 1 in the larger game.
Lemma 6. Let n ≥ 2, k1, ..., kn ≥ 2, and i ∈ {1, ..., n}. If h succeeds on
U(k1, ..., ki + 1, ..., kn), then h succeeds on U(k1, ..., ki, ..., kn).
Lemma 7 tells us that the same is true of adding players to the game. Its
proof also uses a simple reduction. The players utilize the strategy mapping for
the (n+1)-player game by behaving as if there is an additional player who never
wishes to move. This preserves genericity, so the lemma also applies to the class
of generic games.
Lemma 7. Let n ≥ 2 and k1, ..., kn, kn+1 ≥ 2. If h succeeds on U(k1, ..., kn, kn+1),
then h succeeds on U(k1, ..., ki, ..., kn). The same is true if we replace U with G.
Finally, Lemma 8 says that h does not succeed on all 2-by-2-by-2 games. An
example is given in its proof of a game with a PNE where h fails to converge.
Lemma 8. No historyless uncoupled stationary strategy mapping succeeds on
U(2, 2, 2).
Proof of Theorem 5. Let A = A1 × ... × An. By Observation 2, it suffices to
show that h does not succeed on U(|A1|, ..., |An|). Assume that h does succeed
on U(|A1|, ..., |An|). If n = 2, |A1|, |A2| > 2, and h succeeds on U(k1, k2), then by
repeatedly applying Lemma 6, h succeeds on U(3, 3). This contradicts Theorem
2. Now suppose that n ≥ 3. If h succeeds on U(|A1|, ..., |An|), then by repeatedly
applying Lemma 7, h succeeds on U(|A1|, |A2|, |A3|). So by repeatedly applying
Lemma 6, h succeeds on U(2, 2, 2). This contradicts Lemma 8.
3.2 Stochastic dynamics for G(A)
We now turn to generic games and to describing the class of profile spaces A
for which there exist historyless uncoupled strategy mappings that succeed on
G(A). Theorem 3 tells us that h succeeds on two-player generic games. In fact,
h also succeeds on three-player generic games where one player has only two
options.
Theorem 9. Let A be a three-player profile space such that one player has only
two actions. Then h succeeds on all generic games (A,U).
The proof of this theorem relies partially on an analogy between a k-by-ℓ-by-
2 generic game and a kℓ-by-2 game that might not be generic. This requires the
following technical lemma showing that under h, two players in a generic game
sometimes behave similarly to a single player.
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Lemma 10. Let k, l ∈ N, and let U ∈ G(k, ℓ) be a game in which neither player
has a strictly dominant action. For every a, b ∈ A such that a is not a PNE for
U , b is hU -reachable from a.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let A = {1, ..., k}×{1, ..., ℓ}×{0, 1} for some ℓ, k ∈ N. Let
U ∈ G(A) and a = (a1, a2, a3) ∈ A. All PNE are absorbing states under h, so it
will suffice to show there is some PNE that is hU -reachable from a.
Let A′ = {1, ..., k} × {1, ..., ℓ}, and consider the games U0 = (u01, u
0
2) and
U1 = (u11, u
1
2) ∈ G(A
′) defined by
u0i (x1, x2) = ui(x1, x2, 0)
u1i (x1, x2) = ui(x1, x2, 1)
for every x1 ∈ {1, ..., k}, x2 ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}, and i ∈ {0, 1}. In this proof we will re-
peatedly use the fact that over any finite number of steps, w.p.p. player 3 doesn’t
move, so if (y1, y2) ∈ A
′ is hU
0
-reachable from (x1, x2) ∈ A
′, then (y1, y2, 0) ∈ A
is hU -reachable from (x1, x2, 0) ∈ A, and similarly for h
U1 .
Claim. If either player has a strictly dominant action in U0 or U1, then some
PNE is hU -reachable from a.
This claim is proved in the appendix. Thus we may assume that neither
player has a strictly dominant action in U0 or in U1. Consider a two-player
game Û = (û1, û2) on Â = ({1, ..., k} × {1, ..., ℓ})× {0, 1} given by
û1(x) =
{
1 if (x1, x2) is a PNE for U
x3
0 otherwise
û2(x) = u3((x1, x2, x3)),
for every x = ((x1, x2), x3) ∈ Â. Note that unlike U , this game is not necessarily
generic. By Theorem 4, some PNE p̂ = ((p1, p2), p3) for Û is h
Û -reachable from
â = ((a1, a2), a3).
Now let x̂ = ((x1, x2), x3) and ŷ = ((y1, y2), y3) ∈ Â such that w.p.p. ŷ =
hÛ (x̂). If x3 6= y3, then x3 6∈ BR
Û
2 (x̂), so x3 6= BR
U
3 (x). Thus w.p.p. h
U (x) =
(x1, x2, y3). Since BR
U
3 (x) 6= x3 6= y3 and |A3| = 2, we must have BR
U
3 (x) = y3,
so if (x1, x2) is a PNE for U
y3, then (x1, x2, y3) is a PNE for U . Otherwise,
by Lemma 10 (y1, y2) is h
Ux3 -reachable from (x1, x2), so y = (y1, y2, y3) is h
U -
reachable from (x1, x2, y3) and therefore from x.
Applying this to the each step on the path by which p̂ is hÛ -reachable from
â, we see that either p = (p1, p2, p3) (which is a PNE for U) is h
U -reachable from
a, or some other PNE for U is encountered in this process and thus hU -reachable
from a.
In fact, two-player and 2-by-k-by-ℓ are the only sizes of generic games on
which h always succeeds.
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Theorem 11. Let A be a profile space. If A has more than three players, or if
every player has more than two actions, then no historyless uncoupled stationary
strategy mapping succeeds on all generic games (A,U).
Before proving this theorem, we present two lemmas whose full proofs are in
the appendix. Lemma 12 says that h does not succeed on all 2-by-2-by-k-by-ℓ
generic games. It is proved by giving an example of such a game.
Lemma 12. For every k, ℓ ≥ 2, h does not succeed on G(2, 2, k, ℓ).
Lemma 13 says that h doesn’t succeed on all three-player generic games in
which all players have at least three actions. This is demonstrated by simple
modifications of the 3-by-3-by-3 game used by Hart and Mas-Colell in their
proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 13. For every k1, k2, k3 ≥ 3, h does not succeed on G(k1, k2, k3)
Proof of Theorem 11. By Observation 2, if suffices to show that h does not
succeed on G(|A1|, ..., |An|). Assume for contradiction that h does succeed on
G(|A1|, ..., |An|). If n = 3 and h succeeds on G(|A1|, |A2|, |A3|), then by Lemma
13 we cannot have |A1|, |A2|, |A3| > 2. If n = 4 and h succeeds on G(|A1|, ..., |A4|),
then by Lemma 12 there are distinct i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that |Ai|, |Aj |, |Ak| >
2. But by Lemma 7, h succeeds on G(|Ai|, |Aj |, |Ak|), contradicting lemma 13. If
n > 4 and h succeeds on G(|A1|, ..., |An|), then by repeatedly applying Lemma
12, h succeeds on G(|A1|, ..., |A4|), which we have already shown to be impossi-
ble.
4 Deterministic uncoupled dynamics
Both h and the strategy mapping used by Hart and Mas-Colell [8] to prove
Theorem 1 are variations on random search. For deterministic dynamics, an
exhaustive search requires more structure, and the challenge for deterministic
players in short-recall uncoupled dynamics is in keeping track of their progress
in the search.
4.1 Positive results
We show that there are successful 3-recall deterministic dynamics by using re-
peated profiles to coordinate.
Theorem 14. For every profile space A, there exists a deterministic uncoupled
3-recall stationary strategy mapping that succeeds on all games (A,U).
Proof. Let n ≥ 2, k1, ..., kn ≥ 2, and A = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., kn}. It suffices
to show that such a strategy mapping exists for U(A). Let σ : A → A be a
cyclic permutation on the profiles. We write σi(a) for the action of player i in
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σ(a). Let f : U(A)→ F(A) be the strategy mapping such that, for every game
U ∈ U(A), player i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and state x = (a, b, c) ∈ A3,
fUi (x) =


ci if b = c and ci ∈ BRi(c)
minBRi(c) if b = c and ci 6∈ BRi(c)
σi(a) if a = b 6= c
ci otherwise.
Informally, the players use repetition to keep track of which profile is the current
“PNE candidate” in each step. If a profile has just been repeated, then it is the
current candidate, and each player plays a best reply to it, with a preference
against moving. If the players look back and see that some profile a was repeated
in the past but then followed by a different profile, they infer that a was rejected
as a candidate and move on by playing a’s successor, σ(a). Otherwise the players
repeat the most recent profile, establishing it as the new candidate. We call
these three types of states query, move-on, and repeat states, respectively. Here
“query” refers to asking each player for one of its best replies to b.
Let U ∈ U(A) be a game with at least one PNE. We wish to show that
fU guarantees convergence to a PNE. Let x = (a, b, c) ∈ A3, and let y be the
next state (b, c, fU (x)). If x is a repeat state, then y = (b, c, c), which is a query
state. If x is a move-on state, then b 6= c, and y = (b, c, σ(a)). If c = σ(a), then
this is a query state; otherwise, it’s a repeat state, which will be followed by the
query state (c, σ(a), σ(a)). Thus every non-query state will be followed within
two steps by a query state.
Now let x = (a, b, b) ∈ A3 be a query state, and let y and z be the next two
states. If b is a PNE, then y = (b, b, b), which is an absorbing state. Otherwise,
y = (b, b, c) for some c 6= b, so y is a move-on state, which will be followed by a
query state (b, σ(b), σ(b)) or (c, σ(b), σ(b)) within two steps. Let p be a PNE for
U . Since σ is cyclic, p = σr(b) for some r ∈ N. So (p, p, p) is reachable from x
unless σs(b) is a PNE for some s < r. It follows that fU guarantees convergence
to a PNE, so f succeeds on U(A).
Recall that Lemma 6 says that in the stochastic setting, adding actions to
a profile space A does not make success on U(A) any easier. In light of that
result, it is perhaps surprising that we can improve on the above bound when
every player has sufficiently many actions.
Theorem 15. If A is a profile space in which every player has at least four
actions, then there exists a 2-recall deterministic uncoupled stationary strategy
mapping that succeeds on all games (A,U).
Proof. Let n ≥ 2, k1, ..., kn ≥ 4, and A = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., kn}. It suffices
to show that such a strategy mapping exists for U(A).
Define a permutation σ : A→ A such that for every a ∈ A, σ(a) is a’s lexico-
graphic successor. Formally, σ(a) = (σ1(a), ..., σn(a)) where for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
σi(a) =
{
ai + 1 mod ki if aj = kj for every j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., n}
ai otherwise,
10
and σn(a) = an + 1 mod kn. Observe then that σ is cyclic, and for each player i
and a ∈ A, we have
σi(a)− ai mod ki ∈ {0, 1}.
We now describe a strategy mapping f : U(A) → F(A). To each U ∈ U , f
assigns the strategy vector fU defined as follows. At state x = (a, b) ∈ A2, fU
differentiates between three types of states, each named according to the event
it prompts:
– move-on: If a 6= b and aj − bj mod kj ∈ {0, 1} for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}, then
the players “move on” from a, in the sense that each player i plays σi(a),
giving fU (x) = σ(a).
– query: If bj − aj mod kj ∈ {0, 1, 2}, then we “query” each player’s utility
function to check whether it is U -best-replying at b. Each player i answers
by playing bi if it is best-replying and bi − 1 mod ki if it is not. So at query
states,
fUi (x) =
{
bi if bi ∈ BRi(b)
bi − 1 mod ki otherwise,
for i = 1, ..., n.
– repeat : Otherwise, each player i “repeats” by playing bi, giving f
U (x) = b.
Notice that because k1, ..., kn ≥ 4, it is never the case that both aj−bj mod kj ∈
{0, 1} and bj − aj mod kj ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Thus the conditions for the move-on and
query types are mutually exclusive, and the three state types are all disjoint.
The state following x = (a, b) is y = (b, fU (x)). If x is a move-on state,
then y = (b, σ(a)). Since for every player i, ai − bi mod ki ∈ {0, 1} and σ(a)i −
ai mod ki ∈ {0, 1}, we have σi(a)− bi mod ki ∈ {0, 1, 2}, so y is a query state. If
x is instead a query state, then bi − f
U
i (x) mod ki ∈ {0, 1} for every player i, so
y is a move-on state unless b = fU (x), in which case y = (b, b) is a query state.
But if b = fU (x) and x was a query state, then bi ∈ BRi(b) for every player i,
i.e., b is a PNE. Finally, if x is a repeat state, then y = (b, b) is a query state.
Thus move-on states and repeat states are always followed by query states,
and ask-all states are never followed by repeat states. We conclude that with
the possible exception of the initial state, every state will be a move-on or query
state, and no two consecutive states will be move-on states. In particular, some
query state is reachable from every initial state.
For any query state x = (a, b), x will be followed by (b, b) if and only if b is
a PNE, and (b, b) is an absorbing state for every PNE b. If b is not a PNE, then
x will be followed will be a move-on state (b, c), for some c ∈ A. This will be
followed by the query state (c, σ(b)). Continuing inductively, since σ is cyclic,
unless the players converge to a PNE, they will examine every profile v ∈ A with
a query state of the form (u, v). Thus for every game U with at least one PNE,
fU guarantees convergence to a PNE, i.e., f succeeds on U(A).
While there are deterministic uncoupled 2-recall dynamics that succeed on
at least some classes that require 2-recall in the stochastic setting, historyless
dynamics of this type fail on U(A) for every profile space A. A proof of the
following theorem is given in the appendix.
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Theorem 16. For every profile space A, no deterministic uncoupled historyless
stationary strategy mapping succeeds on all games (A,U).
5 Future Directions
It remains open to determine tight bounds on the minimum recall of successful
deterministic uncoupled dynamics for every profile space, analogous to those
given in Section 3 for stochastic dynamics. In particular, we make the following
conjecture.
Conjecture 1. There exists a profile space A such that no deterministic uncou-
pled 2-recall strategy mapping succeeds on all games (A,U).
The same questions answered in this work may naturally be asked for other
important classes of games (e.g., symmetric games) and other equilibrium con-
cepts, especially mixed Nash equilibrium. More generally, the resources (e.g., re-
call, memory) required by uncoupled self-stabilizing dynamics in asynchronous
environments should be investigated.
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Appendix
Theorem 4. For every two-player profile space A in which one player has only
two actions, h succeeds on all games (A,U).
Proof. Let k ≥ 2. It suffices to show that h succeeds on U(2, k). Let A =
{1, 2}×{1, ..., k} and U = (u1, u2) ∈ U(A). Suppose that U has at least one PNE,
and recall that every PNE for U is an hU -absorbing state. Let a = (a1, a2) ∈ A,
and consider four cases.
1. Player 1 is best-replying at a and a1 = p1 for some PNE p = (p1, p2). Then
either player 2 is also best-replying and a is a PNE, or hU2 (a) = p2 w.p.p.,
so hU (a) is a PNE w.p.p.
2. Player 1 is not best-replying at a and there is no PNE p such that a1 = p1.
Then w.p.p. hU1 (a) 6= a1 and h
U
2 (a) = a2. Since we assumed that U has a
PNE, hU (a) is then an instance of case 1.
3. Player 1 is best-replying at a and there is no PNE p such that a1 = p1. Then
player 2 is not best-replying at a, so w.p.p. hU2 (a) ∈ BR2(a), but h
U (a)
cannot be a PNE since hU1 (a) = a1. Then player 1 is not best-replying at
hU (a), i.e., hU (a) is an instance of case 2.
4. Player 1 is not best-replying at a and a1 = p1 for some PNE p = (p1, p2).
Then w.p.p. hU1 (a) 6= a1 and h
U
2 (a) = a2, in which case player 1 is best-
replying at hU (a) = (hU1 (a), a2), since player 1 has only two actions. Then
hU (a) is an instance of case 1 or 3.
We conclude that from every state a ∈ A, some PNE for U is hU -reachable from
a. Thus h succeeds on U(A).
Theorem 6. Let n ≥ 2, k1, ..., kn ≥ 2, and i ∈ {1, ..., n}. If h succeeds on
U(k1, ..., ki + 1, ..., kn), then h succeeds on U(k1, ..., ki, ..., kn).
Proof. Let
A = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., ki} × ...× {1, ..., kn},
A′ = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., ki + 1} × ...× {1, ..., kn}.
Suppose that h succeeds on U(A′). For each U = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U(A), define
another game U ′ = (u′1, ..., u
′
n) ∈ U(A
′) such that for every j ∈ {1, ..., n} and
a ∈ A,
u′j(a) = uj(a),
u′j(a1, ..., ki + 1, ..., an) = uj(a1, ..., ki, ..., an).
Thus in U ′ every player is always indifferent to whether player i plays ki or
ki + 1.
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We now define a strategy mapping f for games on A. For every U ∈ U(A),
fU is given by
Pr
(
fUj (a) = h
U ′
j (a1, ..., ki + 1, ..., an)
∣∣ ai = ki) = 1/2,
Pr
(
fUj (a) = h
U ′
j (a)
∣∣ ai = ki) = 1/2, and
Pr
(
fUj (a) = h
U ′
j (a)
∣∣ ai 6= ki) = 1,
for every a ∈ A and j 6= i. That is, whenever the players see that player i has
played ki, each chooses independently at random to interpret that action either
as ki or ki+1, then plays the action prescribed by h
U ′ . Player i behaves similarly
under f , but we have to ensure that it’s never instructed to play ki + 1:
Pr
(
fUj (a) = min{ki, h
U ′
i (a1, ..., ki + 1, ..., an)}
∣∣ ai = ki) = 1/2
Pr
(
fUj (a) = min{ki, h
U ′
i (a)
∣∣ ai = ki) = 1/2
Pr
(
fUj (a) = h
U ′
i (a)
∣∣ ai 6= ki) = 1.
Now fix U = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U(A), and assume that U has at least one PNE p ∈
A. To see that p is an absorbing state for fU , we consider two cases. First, suppose
that pi 6= ki. Then p is also a PNE for U
′, hence p is an absorbing state for hU
′
. So
for j 6= i, fUj (p) = h
U ′
j (p) = pj , and f
U
i (p) = min{ki, h
U ′
i (p)} = min{ki, pi} = pi.
Now suppose instead that pi = ki. Then both p and p
′ = (p1, ..., ki + 1, ..., pn)
are stable states for h(U ′). So for j 6= i,
fUj (p) ∈ {h
U ′
j (p1, ..., ki + 1, ..., pn), f
U ′
j (p)}
= {hU
′
j (p
′), hU
′
j (p)}
= {pj},
and
fUi (p) ∈
{
min{ki, h
U ′
i (p1, ..., ki + 1, ..., pn)},min{ki, h
U ′
i (p)}
}
⊆
{
min{ki, h
U ′
i (p
′)}, ki, h
U ′
i (p)
}
=
{
min{ki, p
′
i}, ki, pi
}
= {pi}.
Thus p is an absorbing state for fU .
It remains to show that fU always reaches a PNE. Let a ∈ A ⊆ A′. Since
U ′ has a PNE and h succeeds on U(A′), U ′ has some PNE q = (q1, ..., qn) ∈ A
′
such that q is hU
′
-reachable from a. So for some T ∈ N, theres is a partial
hU
′
-run a(0), ..., a(T ) such that a(0) = a and a(T ) = q. Since q is a PNE for U ′,
q′ = (q1, ...,min{qi, ki}, ..., qn) is a PNE for both U and U
′.
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Now let b(0), ..., b(T ) be a partial fU -run such that b(0) = a. Suppose, for
some 0 ≤ t < T , that
b(t) = (a
(t)
1 , ...,min{a
(t)
i , ki}, ..., a
(t)
n ).
Then for j 6= i, b
(t+1)
j = f
U
j (b
(t)) = hU
′
j (a
(t)) with probability at least 12 , and
b
(t+1)
i = f
U
i (b
(t)) = min{hU
′
j (a
(t)), ki} with probability at least
1
2 . So with posi-
tive probability,
b(t+1) = (a
(t+1)
1 , ...,min{a
(t+1)
i , ki}, ..., a
(t+1)
n ).
By induction, Pr[b(T ) = q′] > 0, i.e., q′ is fU -reachable from a. We conclude
that f succeeds on U(A), and by Observation 2 it follows that h succeeds on
U(A).
Theorem 7. Let n ≥ 2 and k1, ..., kn, kn+1 ≥ 2. If h succeeds on U(k1, ..., kn, kn+1),
then h succeeds on U(k1, ..., ki, ..., kn). The same is true if we replace U with G.
Proof. Let
A = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., kn},
A′ = {1, ..., k1} × ...× {1, ..., kn} × {1, ..., kn+1}.
Suppose that h succeeds on U(A′), and for each U = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U(A), define a
game U ′ = (u′1, ..., u
′
n, u
′
n+1) ∈ U(A
′) such that for every x = (x1, ..., xn, xn+1) ∈
A′,
u′i(x) = ui((x1, ..., xn))
for each player i ∈ {1, ..., n} and
u′n+1(x) =
{
1 if xn+1 = 1
0 otherwise.
Informally, the first n players are apathetic about player n + 1’s action, and
player n+ 1 always prefers to play 1. Notice that x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ A is a PNE
for U if and only if (x1, ..., xn, 1) is a PNE for U
′.
Given a game U , we use U ′ to define a strategy mapping f for games on A.
For each x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ A and i ∈ {1, ..., n},
fUi (x) = h
U ′
i ((x1, ..., xn, 1)).
Now fix U = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U(A) and a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A, and assume
that U has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Then U ′ does also, so letting
a′ = (a1, ..., an, 1) ∈ A
′, some PNE p′ = (p1, ..., pn, 1) for U
′ is hU
′
-reachable
from a′. We show that p = (p1, ..., pn), which is a PNE for U , is f
U -reachable
from a.
Since p′ is hU
′
-reachable from a′, there is a partial hU
′
-run a(0), ..., a(T ), for
some T ∈ N, such that a(0) = a′ and a(T ) = p′. For each t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}, if
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a
(t)
n+1 = 1, then player n+ 1 is best-replying at a
(t), so a
(t+1)
n+1 = 1. Thus player
1 is playing 1 at every state in the partial run. Now let b(0), ..., b(T ) be a partial
fU -run such that b(0) = a. At each step t, if a(t) = (b
(t)
1 , ...., b
(t)
n , 1), then
fU (b(t)) = hU
′
(b
(t)
1 , ...., b
(t)
n , 1) = h
U ′(b(t)),
so w.p.p. a(t+1) = (b
(t+1)
1 , ...., b
(t+1)
n , 1). It follows that w.p.p. a(T ) = p′, i.e.,
b(T ) = p. Thus p is fU -reachable from a, so f succeeds on U(A). By Observation
2, then, h succeeds on U(A).
For the second part of the lemma, simply notice that U ′ is generic whenever
U is, thus the above argument still holds when G(A) is substituted for U(A).
Theorem 8. No historyless uncoupled stationary strategy mapping succeeds on
U(2, 2, 2).
Proof. Let A = {1, 2, 3}. By Observation 2 it suffices to show that h does not
succeed on U(A). Consider the game U = (u1, u2, u3) ∈ U(A) where ui((x, y, z))
is the ith coordinate of Mx[y, z], for
M1 =
[
1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
1, 0, 0 0, 1, 1
]
M2 =
[
0, 1, 0 0, 1, 1
0, 0, 0 1, 0, 1
]
.
The unique PNE of U is p = (1, 1, 1). Let a ∈ A with a3 = 2. Then h
U
3 (a) = 2,
since 2 ∈ BR3(a) for every a. It follows that under h
U , if the third player initially
plays 2, then it will never play 1, so p is not hU -reachable from, for example,
(1, 1, 2). Thus h does not succeed on U(A).
Claim from Theorem 9. If either player has a strictly dominant action in U0
or U1, then some PNE is hU -reachable from a.
Proof. Suppose that player 1 has a strictly dominant action α in U0, and consider
five cases.
1. U has a PNE (p1, p2, 0), and a3 = 0. Then player 1 is best-replying at a only
if a1 = α = p1, so w.p.p. h
U (a) = (p1, a2, 0). Player 2 is best-replying at
(p1, a2, 0) only if a2 = p2, so w.p.p. h
U (hU (a)) = (p1, p2, 0).
2. U has a PNE (q1, q2, 1), a3 = 1, and BR
U
3 (a) = 1.
– If some player has a strictly dominant action in U1, then this is symmetric
to the situation described in case 1, and q is hU -reachable from a.
– So assume that no player has a strictly dominant action in U1. If a is not
a PNE for U , then (a1, a2) is not a PNE for U
1. So by Lemma 10, (q1, q2) is
hU
1
-reachable from (a1, a2), i.e., the PNE (q1, q2, 1) is h
U -reachable from a.
3. U has no PNE (p1, p2, 0), and a3 = 0. As in case 1, w.p.p. h
U (a) = (α, a2, 0).
Let b2 = BR2(α, a2, 0). Then w.p.p. h
U ((α, a2, 0)) = (α, b2, 0), and player
3 is not best-replying at (α, b2, 0) since it is not a PNE for U . Thus letting
b = (α, b2, 1), w.p.p. h
U ((α, b2, 0)) = b, so b is h
U -reachable from a, and b is
an instance of case 2.
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4. U has a PNE (q1, q2, 1), a3 = 1, and BR
U
3 (a) = 0. Then w.p.p. h
U (a) =
(a1, a2, 0), which is an instance of case 1 or 3.
5. U has no PNE (q1, q2, 1), and a3 = 1.
– If some player has a strictly dominant action in U1, then w.p.p. that action
will be played in hU (a), and w.p.p. the other player will play its best reply to
that action in the next stage. Then the first two players are playing a PNE
for U1, so player 3 is not best-replying and may play 0 in the next round,
giving an instance of case 1.
– So assume that no player has a strictly dominant action in U1. There is
some (b1, b2) ∈ A
′ such that BR3(b1, b2, 1) = 0, so w.p.p. h
U (b1, b2, 1) =
(b1, b2, 0). If (a1, a2) is a PNE for U
1, then player 3 is not best replying and
w.p.p. hU (a) = (a1, a2, 0). Otherwise by Lemma 10 (b1, b2) is h
U1 -reachable
from (a1, a2), so (b1, b2, 0), which is an instance of case 1, is h
U -reachable
from a.
It follows that some PNE for U is hU -reachable from every a ∈ A. By symmetry,
the same holds whenever either player has a strictly dominant action in either
U0 or U1.
Theorem 10. Let k, l ∈ N, and let U ∈ G(k, ℓ) be a game in which neither
player has a strictly dominant action. For every a, b ∈ A such that a is not a
PNE for U , b is hU -reachable from a.
Proof. If k = ℓ = 2, then each player either prefers to match or to mismatch the
other’s action, and lemma holds by routine inspection of the four possibilities.
So assume ℓ > 2.
Let a, b ∈ A, where a is not a PNE for U . Notice that because U is generic,
A contains exactly ℓ states where player 1 is best-replying and k states where
player 2 is best-replying, so there are at most k+ ℓ states where either player is
best-replying. And for any x, y ∈ A, if neither player is best-replying at x, then
hU (x) = y with probability 1
kℓ
. Hence it suffices to show that more than k + ℓ
distinct states in A are reachable from a.
If player 2 is best-replying at a, then since player 2 has no dominant action,
player 1 has some action a′1 such that player 2 is not best-replying at (a
′
1, a2).
And player 1 is not best replying at a (since a is not a PNE), so w.p.p. hU (a) =
(a′1, a2). Thus some state in which player 2 is not best-replying is reachable from
a.
Let x = (α, β) be such a state and consider the number of distinct states
reachable from x. Player 2 might play any of its actions, so there are at least the
ℓ possibilities (α, 1), ..., (α, ℓ) for hU (x). Since player 1 has no dominant action,
there is some γ ∈ {1, ..., ℓ} such that, letting y = (α, γ), α 6∈ BR1(y), so player 1
is not best-replying at y. By the same logic, (1, γ), ..., (k, γ) are possibilities for
hU (y), and there is a z = (δ, γ) such that player 2 is not best-replying at z and
(δ, 1), ..., (δ, ℓ) are possibilities for hU (y).
We’ve shown that (α, 1), ..., (α, ℓ), (1, γ), ..., (k, γ), (δ, 1), ..., (δ, ℓ) are all reach-
able from x. Suppose that α = δ. Then y = z and neither player is best replying
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at y, so all of A is reachable from y. Otherwise,∣∣{(α, 1), ..., (α, ℓ), (1, γ), ..., (k, γ), (δ, 1), ..., (δ, ℓ)}∣∣ ≥ k + 2ℓ− 2
> k + ℓ.
Since x and y are both reachable from a, this completes the proof.
Theorem 12. For every k, ℓ ≥ 2, h does not succeed on G(2, 2, k, ℓ).
Proof. Let A = {1, 2} × {1, 2} × {1, ..., k3} × {1, ..., k4}, with k3, k4 ≥ 2. By
Observation 2, it suffices to show that h does not succeed on G(A). Let U =
(u1, u2, u3, u4) ∈ G(A) be defined as follows. For every a = (a1, a2, a3, a4) ∈ A,
u1(a) =
{
1 if a1 = a2
0 otherwise,
u2(a) =
{
1 if a1 = a2 XOR a3 = a4 = 1
0 otherwise,
u3(a) = u4(a) =
{
1 if a3 = a4
0 otherwise.
Informally, player 1 always wants to match player 2’s action, players 3 and 4
always want to match each other’s actions, and player 2 wants to match player
1’s action except when players 3 and 4 are both playing 1, in which case player
2 wants to mismatch player 1’s action.
U has the unique PNE (2, 2, 2, 2). Let a ∈ A such that a3 = a4. Then players
3 and 4 are both best-replying, so hU3 (a) = h
U
4 (a) = 1. It follows that (2, 2, 2, 2)
is not hU -reachable from (1, 1, 1, 1), so h does not succeed on G(A).
Theorem 13. For every k1, k2, k3 ≥ 3, h does not succeed on G(k1, k2, k3)
Proof. Let A = {1, ..., k1} × {1, ..., k2} × {1, ..., k3}, with k1, k2, k3 ≥ 3. By Ob-
servation 2, it suffices to show that h does not succeed on G(A). Hart and
Mas-Colell [8] give an example of a 3-by-3-by-3 generic game on which no his-
toryless uncoupled strategy mapping succeeds. The game is U = (u1, u2, u3) ∈
U({1, 2, 3}3) where ui((x, y, z)) is the ith coordinate of Mx[y, z], for
M1 =

0, 0, 0 0, 4, 4 2, 1, 24, 4, 0 4, 0, 4 3, 1, 3
1, 2, 3 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0


M2 =

4, 0, 4 4, 4, 0 3, 1, 30, 4, 4 0, 0, 0 2, 1, 2
1, 3, 3 1, 2, 2 0, 0, 0


M3 =

2, 2, 1 3, 3, 1 0, 0, 03, 3, 1 2, 2, 1 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 6, 6, 6

 .
They observe that U has the unique PNE (3, 3, 3), and prove that if a ∈ A
contains both a 1 and a 2, then for any uncoupled historyless strategy mapping
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f , fU (a) also contains both a 1 and a 2. To prove the lemma, we pad the game
with extra actions and show that the expanded game retains this property.
We define the expanded game U ′ = (u′1, u
′
2, u
′
3) ∈ G(A) by, for each player i
and profile a = (a1, a2, a3) ∈ A,
u′i((a1, a2, a3)) =
{
0 if ai > 3
ui((min{a1, 3},min{a2, 3},min{a3, 3})) otherwise.
So for each new action ai > 3 for player i, ai is weakly dominated and both
other players are indifferent to whether i plays ai or 3.
Suppose that at a ∈ A at least one player is playing 1 and at least one
player is playing 2. If a ∈ {1, 2, 3}3, then since all the new actions are weakly
dominated, Hart and Mas-Colell’s analysis applies directly: a player playing 1
and a player playing 2 are best-replying, so hU (a) contains both a 1 and a 2.
Otherwise, one player i is playing ai > 3. In this case the other two players are
best-replying, and they played 1 and 2, so hU (a) again contains both a 1 and a
2. It follows that the players will never reach the PNE (3, 3, 3) starting from, for
example, (1, 2, 1), when following hU .
Theorem 16. For every profile space A, no deterministic uncoupled historyless
stationary strategy mapping succeeds on all games (A,U).
Proof. Except when A = A1×A2 and either |A1| or |A2| is 2, this follows directly
from Theorem 5. So let k ≥ 2 and A = {1, 2}× {1, ..., k}, and assume that some
deterministic historyless uncoupled strategy mapping f succeeds on U(A).
Consider the game U = (u1, u2) ∈ U(A) defined by
u1(a) =
{
1 if a1 = 1
0 if a1 = 2
u2(a) =
{
1 if a2 = a1 = 1 or a2 ≥ a1 = 2
0 otherwise,
for every a = (a1, a2) ∈ A. The unique PNE of this game is p = (1, 1), so since
we assumed that f succeeds on U(A), p is fU -reachable from every a ∈ A.
Define a new game U ′ = (u′1, u
′
2) ∈ U(A) by
u′1(b) =
{
2 if b2 ≥ x1 = 2 and f
U
2 (1, b2) = 1
u1(b) otherwise
u′2(b) = u2(b),
for every b = (b1, b2) ∈ A. Informally, each player’s preferences are exactly the
same as in U , except that player 1 now prefers to play 2 whenever fU would
instruct player 2 to play 1. Notice that U ′ also has p = (1, 1) as its unique PNE,
and that by uncoupledness, fU
′
2 (b) = f
U
2 (b) for every b ∈ A.
Let a = (1, α) ∈ A, for some α 6= 1. Notice that u′1(a) = u1(a) = 1, and
consider two cases.
19
1. fU2 (a) = 1. Then u
′
1((2, α)) = 2, so player 1 is not U
′-best-replying at a.
Thus by Observation 1 fU
′
1 (a) 6= 1. Since f
U ′
2 (a) = f
U
2 (a) = 1, we have
fU
′
(a) = (2, 1).
2. fU2 (a) 6= 1. Then u
′
1((2, α)) = u1((2, α)) = 0, so player 1 is U
′-best-replying
at a, so by Observation 1, fU
′
1 (a) = 1. Since f
U ′
2 (a) = f
U
2 (a) 6= 1, we have
fU
′
(a) = (1, β) for some β 6= 1.
Now let b = (2, 1). Then u′1(b) = u1(b) = 0, and u
′
2(b) = u2(b) = 0, so neither
player is best-replying. So by Observation 1 fU
′
1 (b) 6= 2 and f
U ′
2 (b) 6= 1, i.e.,
fU
′
(a) = (1, β) for some β 6= 1. It follows that p = (1, 1) is not fU
′
-reachable
from (2, 1), so f does not guarantee convergence to a PNE in U ′, hence f does
not succeed on U(A).
20
